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LITTORAL RIGHTS UNDER 
THE TAKINGS DOCTRINE: 
THE CLASH BETWEEN THE IUS 
NATURALE AND STOP THE BEACH 
RENOURISHMENT 
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN* 
The recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in Stop 
the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of 
Environmental Protection1 bristles with conceptual difficulties and 
practical ambiguities that cannot be easily avoided or easily answered. 
The major conceptual issue in Stop the Beach Renourishment is 
whether the Supreme Court should recognize “judicial takings” under 
the Takings Clause, which reads: “[N]or shall private property be 
taken for public use, without just compensation.”2 The textual claim 
for recognizing judicial takings is that the Takings Clause does not 
differentiate between various branches of government and thus 
covers the actions of the judiciary as well as those of the legislative 
and executive branches.3 
Opponents of this doctrine often deride it as a constitutional 
oxymoron. By definition, state courts cannot take the very property 
rights that their former decisions have established. Given that this 
tension exists within any unitary judicial system, the doctrine of 
judicial takings can, in practice, only arise in a federalist system. At 
 
* Laurence A. Tisch Professor of Law, New York University School of Law; the Peter and 
Bedford Senior Fellow, The Hoover Institution; and Senior Lecturer, The University of 
Chicago. This paper was prepared for a conference on Stop the Beach Renourishment to be held 
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of Constitutional Law & Public Policy. My thanks to Brett Davenport and Christopher Tan, 
NYU Law School Class of 2012, for their usual expert research assistance. 
 1. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010). 
 2. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 3. For a defense of this view, see Ilya Somin, Stop the Beach Renourishment and the 
Problem of Judicial Takings, 6 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 91, 94–96 (2011).  
DO NOT DELETE 6/21/2011  12:25:40 PM 
38 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 6:1 
the state level, there is no reason to expect that any state court will 
strike down the common-law rights that it has just announced. Even if 
a court disagreed with its past decisions, the more modest way to 
approach the problem is to overturn the prior law as part of the 
evolution of common-law rights.4 Similarly, in the highly restrictive 
domain of federal common law,5 the Supreme Court cannot be 
expected to invalidate its judicial decisions under the Takings Clause. 
The problem, therefore, can only arise in practice as it did in Stop the 
Beach Renourishment—in a federal system, when a federal court 
invalidates the decision of the state supreme court, which is therefore 
rendered less than supreme in the articulation of its own doctrine. To 
many, this kind of interaction represents the antithesis to the divided 
system of rights under our federalist system.6 
Notwithstanding these powerful objections, there is a sensible, 
albeit restricted, place for the doctrine of judicial takings under 
federal constitutional law. That approach makes little sense when 
property rights in a positivist tradition are thought to be 
manifestations of state power. It has far more attraction, however, 
within the natural law system, in which judges are rightly seen as 
custodians of a customary system of property rights that were created 
by common practice long before there were any courts to enforce the 
rules in question. Those conditions hold, as I shall show, in connection 
with water law where the so-called ius naturale7 was regarded by all 
courts as the traditional lodestone by which these questions were 
measured.8 Under that view, it is wrong to think of water law as if it 
were “judge-made” law when, historically, it was derived from a 
system of decentralized customary law whose basic norms had been 
firmly entrenched long before the appearance of a centralized judicial 
system. 
It is therefore appropriate to hold courts responsible for keeping 
to the main contours of water law in making their judicial decisions. 
Stop the Beach Renourishment thus offered a much needed way to 
 
 4. For stress on this theme, see Stacey L. Dogan & Ernest A. Young, Judicial Takings and 
Collateral Attack on State Court Property Decisions, 6 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 107, 
107–08 (2011). 
 5. See, e.g., Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366 (1943) (holding that 
“[t]he rights and duties of the United States . . . are governed by federal rather than local law”). 
 6. See Dogan & Young, supra note 4, at 108–10.  
 7. See infra Part III. 
 8. Richard A. Epstein, Playing by Different Rules? Property Rights in Land and Water, 
LINCOLN INSTITUTE (forthcoming), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract 
_id=1719688 [hereinafter Epstein, Playing by Different Rules]. 
DO NOT DELETE 6/21/2011  12:25:40 PM 
2011] LITTORAL RIGHTS UNDER THE TAKINGS DOCTRINE 39 
address the actions of state courts whose decisions have strayed too 
far—and for no good reason—from these customary standards. 
Ironically, the difficulties in Stop the Beach Renourishment did not lie 
with the particulars of the Beach and Shore Preservation Act 
(Preservation Act),9 which represents a surprisingly sensible 
environmental scheme. Instead, the target of judicial wrath should 
have been Florida’s earlier case law that twisted every known 
principle of water law by treating man-made diversions from a lake or 
a river as though they were “avulsions,” or major natural events that 
alter the flow of water without any human intervention.10 Put simply, 
the polar opposites in any system of tortious responsibility for 
individual action are acts of God and deliberate creations of harm by 
an individual. In a remarkable tour-de-force, Justice Scalia’s analysis 
of Florida’s statutory scheme failed to distinguish between these two 
kinds of acts. The weakness in his decision, consequently, did not 
relate to his general analysis of judicial takings, but to his uncritical 
treatment of the Florida case of Martin v. Busch11 (which authorized 
the uncompensated diversion) as the legitimate starting point for the 
analysis, instead of treating that decision as the proper object of wrath 
in any judicial takings analysis. Once the law of littoral rights is 
correctly sorted out, the Preservation Act should be regarded, 
presumptively, as a taking of littoral rights. But these takings may not 
require any explicit cash compensation because the key provisions of 
the Preservation Act may provide full in-kind compensation in three 
separate forms: the protection of the beach on the landward side of 
the wall, the creation of the view easement, and the creation of the 
access easement, which together could easily exceed the value of any 
possible accretions on the seaward side of the wall. 
In order to make out this case, I shall proceed as follows. In Part I, 
I shall outline the general features of Florida’s water law both before 
and after passage of the Preservation Act. In Part II, I shall put the 
rules of property law in context, dealing in turn with land, water, and 
the beach that lies between them as a matter of both common and 
customary law. In Part III, I shall examine the role of the ius naturale 
(the natural law) in the origin and formation of property law, under 
both the common and Roman law systems. In that section, I shall 
outline the historical distinction between alluvion, or gradual changes, 
 
 9. 1961 Fla. Laws ch. 61–246, amended by, FLA. STAT. §§ 161.011–161.45 (2007). 
 10. For discussion, see infra Part IV.B. 
 11. Martin v. Busch, 112 So. 274 (Fla. 1927). 
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and avulsion, or radical changes, and explain the strong efficiency 
characteristics of the classical rules as they apply to property owners 
of both riparian and littoral interests. In part IV, I turn to the question 
of judicial takings and defend that doctrine in order to explore how 
the basic rules were misapplied in connection with the Florida 
statutory scheme. In part V, I turn to the larger question of when the 
doctrine of judicial takings should be applied in other cases and 
conclude that its application should be limited to those circumstances 
in which the decided cases make a radical break from well-established 
common-law patterns that systematically work for the advantage of 
the state or some identifiable private faction. A short conclusion 
speculates on the reasons for the abject breakdown of private law 
conceptions of property rights in the Supreme Court. 
I. THE SHAPE OF FLORIDA LAW 
Traditionally, Florida law distinguishes between riparian rights, 
which govern those who own land adjacent to a river, and littoral 
rights, which govern those who own land bordering a lake or an 
ocean.12 In general, both types of rights are generally established as a 
matter of common law—a proposition that is quickly freighted with 
much meaning. The littoral rights at issue in Stop the Beach 
Renourishment include the ability of individuals to gain access to the 
beach from their own property and to have the right of an 
unobstructed view over the beach to the water beyond.13 That 
delineation of rights necessarily limits the rights of the public and the 
state over the beach. As a common-law matter, neither the state nor 
any private party could build along the beach a wall that blocked off 
access to the water from abutting landowners.14 The situation only 
becomes more complicated because the interface between public and 
private rights necessarily varies as the beach itself moves in response 
to all sorts of natural elements. Left to its own devices, nature can 
wipe out some littoral property if the water level rises, or it can lead 
to a major expansion of beachfront property if the water level falls, so 
 
 12. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 
2598 n.1 (2010) (“Many cases and statutes use ‘riparian’ to mean abutting any body of water. 
The Florida Supreme Court, however, has adopted a more precise usage whereby ‘riparian’ 
means abutting a river or stream and ‘littoral’ means abutting an ocean, sea, or lake.”). 
 13. See id. at 2600 (“. . . (1) the right to receive accretions to their property; and (2) the 
right to have the contact of their property with the water remain intact.”). 
 14. See id. at 2594 (“Littoral land owners have, inter alia, rights to have access to the water . 
. . .”). 
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that more land becomes fit for vegetation and other forms of use. 
The movement of the beach is necessarily a source of uncertainty 
for the people who own adjacent property, and the question is what, if 
anything, the state should do to eliminate that uncertainty and the 
reduction in land value that it normally generates. In Florida’s case, 
the solution was to pass the Preservation Act,15 the purpose of which 
was to fight nature and to stabilize the beachfront by adding sand and 
other support to the beach to prevent erosion. In effect, the statutory 
scheme established an “erosion control line” at the point where the 
private upland became a public beach.16 It then took efforts on the 
seaward side of that line to shore up the beach, while taking steps to 
preserve the littoral owner’s access to the beach and views of the 
ocean.17 The decision to construct the needed barriers was, of 
necessity, a collective one because the investments in these erosion-
control devices will work only if done on sections of the beach that 
are more extensive than the boundary lines of each individual plot of 
land. On beachfront sites, these lots tend to be narrow and deep in 
order to maximize the two elements of value that the Preservation 
Act strove to preserve. The collective good that is provided by erosion 
control, however, might not have equal value for all beach owners, 
some of whom may prefer to take the risk of erosion in order to 
preserve the option to acquire new lands as the beach goes out to 
sea.18 
The constitutional challenges presented by the scheme of 
beachfront control are profound because they involve the intersection 
of two separate tasks. The first is to get a clear grasp of the property 
rights regime that operated in Florida prior to the advent of the 
Preservation Act.19 These rights were, for the most part, not defined by 
statute but by some system of common-law adjudication, the status of 
which is always hard to pin down. Stop the Beach Renourishment 
therefore spent a good deal of time sorting out the set of property 
rights to which the Takings Clause applied. That task is no mean feat 
given that the beach lies at the intersection of land and water, which 
are subject to radically different property rights regimes. The 
touchstone for the former tends to be exclusive rights in single 
 
 15. 1961 Fla. Laws ch. 61–246, amended by, FLA. STAT. §§ 161.011–161.45 (2007). 
 16. See FLA. STAT. § 161.191; see also § 161.151(3) (defining “erosion control line”). 
 17. See FLA. STAT. § 161.141. 
 18. For discussion of the valuation questions, see infra Part IV.B. 
 19. FLA. STAT. §§ 161.011–161.45 (2007). 
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persons, while the touchstone for the latter is common and shared 
rights by large (and often different) groups of individuals.20 Only if 
these common-law property rights have constitutional status does the 
takings inquiry make sense. If littoral rights were just a creature of the 
state, such that they could be created or cancelled at will, then the 
entire structure of littoral rights, indeed all property rights, would 
come tumbling down.21 No longer would the function of the state be 
to preserve and defend an independent set of property rights. Instead, 
it could create or displace any system of entitlements, whether on land 
or water, by a simple assertion of collective political will, thereby 
undermining one of the central features of any sound system of 
rights—the stability of expectations.22 
Once the definition of littoral rights is fixed, the next question is 
how the federal constitutional protection should apply to this form of 
private property. This inquiry is not one-dimensional and is typically 
understood in connection with other forms of government action, 
both federal and state, to involve at least four interlocking inquiries.23 
First, whether the state action has taken private property in light of 
the difficulty of defining beachfront rights to begin with. Second, 
whether that taking is for a public use. Third, whether just 
compensation has been provided for the property so taken. And 
fourth, whether there is some police power justification that allows 
the state to regulate without the payment of compensation. Justice 
Scalia thought that the entire case could be disposed of by accepting 
two related propositions, which had a Job-like quality.24 In his view, 
 
 20. For a discussion of these points, see Epstein, Playing by Different Rules, supra note 8. 
For a comprehensive overview of the Roman and English origins of water law, see JOSHUA 
GETZLER, A HISTORY OF WATER RIGHTS AT COMMON LAW (2006). 
 21. See, e.g., United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 493 (1973) (holding that the government 
did not owe compensation for grazing rights appurtenant to private land subject to 
condemnation when these rights were cancellable at will without cause). This issue is quite 
different from those raised in the companion case of Almota Farmers Elev. & Whse. Co. v. 
United States, 409 U.S. 470 (1973), in which the government owed compensation to a tenant 
whose improvements had value after the expiration of the current term of the lease. The 
interference with advantageous relations caused a loss of those residual values. It is one thing 
for the government to exercise its own right to terminate a relationship. It is quite another thing 
for it to disrupt the valuable relationships between two private parties and offer only meager 
compensation at best. 
 22. See Epstein, Playing by Different Rules, supra note 8, at 6–10 (discussing the status of 
collective property rights). 
 23. For an extended treatment of this issue, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE 
PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985) [hereinafter TAKINGS] (developing 
the comprehensive four-part test referred to in the text). 
 24. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2595 
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the law gaveth by insisting that the Constitution applies to takings by 
the judiciary as much as it applies to takings by the legislature or the 
executive.25 But thereafter, the law tooketh away when the supposed 
“avulsive” conduct of the state did not take away any rights that were 
part of the package of littoral rights involved in this case. I agree with 
him on the first point, but think that his analysis of both the 
underlying property rights and the Takings Clause is incorrect. Quite 
simply, in his view, the proposed state action was not a taking at all 
insofar as it did not interfere with prior expectations, so that there 
were no property rights to which the Takings Clause could attach.26 I 
do not think the Florida cases that he cites are sufficient to support 
that contention, and believe that property rights were indeed taken. 
Because the Florida scheme, unlike so many others, supplies return 
compensation in the form of both erosion protection and the 
preservation of view and access, it is an open question of fact, best 
resolved on remand, as to whether the bundle of rights supplied is 
equal to or greater in value than the access and view rights that were 
disrupted by the Preservation Act.27 
II: THE PROPERTY LAW CONTEXT 
A. Land, Water, and Beaches 
It is well understood that two major branches of property law deal 
with water and land and that these areas of law are governed by quite 
different principles. The gist of the distinction is that property rights in 
land start with the notion of a relatively coherent body of rights in a 
determinate thing, which can be measured in three dimensions: space, 
time, and incidents of ownership. The first of these is space. The 
general view follows the Roman maxim, cuius est solum eius est usque 
ad coelum usque ad inferos,28 such that whosoever owns land owns 
from the heavens above to the depths of the earth below. Under that 
view, all air and mineral rights belong to the surface owner, who can 
use or dispose of them as he sees fit. Next, property must be 
organized along the dimension of time. In addition to the fee simple, 
 
(2010). 
 25. See id. at 2601 (“The Takings Clause . . . is not addressed to the action of a specific 
branch or branches.”). 
 26. See id. at 2615. 
 27. See infra Part IV.B. 
 28. Meaning, “for whoever owns the soil, it is theirs up to Heaven and down to Hell.” 
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property can be divided into life estates and remainders, so that 
different people can hold sequential interests in the same asset at 
different pre-appointed times.29 And finally, property in land can be 
divided by the incidents of ownership, including possession, use, and 
disposition. The strong consensus with respect to property in land is to 
favor a set of exclusive rights so that a single owner is in a position to 
deal with the property to the exclusion of everyone else.30 This basic 
position is qualified in a number of ways, but these modifications, with 
reciprocal easements between neighbors, are sufficiently limited so 
that they do not undermine the basic overall conception.31 
Property rights in water start from the opposite direction. 
Whether we think of rivers and streams on the one hand or lakes and 
oceans on the other, property rights tend to be held in common so 
that large numbers of individuals have access to a body of water in 
different ways, but over which no one person has exclusive rights.32 
Quite simply, the property arrangements that are most conducive to 
the efficient use of land are wholly inappropriate for water. At the 
same time, however, the complexity of water rights is such that no 
single system of shared or common use makes sense for all the places 
in which water is used. Variation across systems is a given and it is 
these differences that have to be accommodated in connection with 
the constitutional protection of property rights. In this regard, the 
received wisdom is that the state defines the rights that the Takings 
Clause then protects under a set of constitutional tests and standards 
that are decidedly a matter of federal common law.33 
The beach, of course, lies at the crossroads between land and 
water. In most cases, the size of a beach tends to be relatively 
 
 29. For the standard account of future interests, see THOMAS F. BERGIN & PAUL G. 
HASKELL, PREFACE TO ESTATES IN LAND AND FUTURE INTERESTS (1984); for its evolution, 
see A.W.B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE LAND LAW (2d ed. 1986). 
 30. As in Blackstone’s oft-stated dictum of real property: “That sole and despotic dominion 
which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of 
the right of any other individual in the universe.” 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 
*2, discussed in Epstein, Playing by Different Rules, supra note 8, at 51–52. For the 
overemphasis of exclusivity in the bundle of rights, see Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 
164 (1979), and also, Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 
730 (1998). 
 31. For a discussion of implicit in-kind compensation in this connection, see TAKINGS, 
supra note 23. 
 32. For the relationship between private and common property, see Richard A. Epstein, 
On the Optimal Mix of Common and Private Property, 11 SOC. PHIL. & POL. 17 (1994). 
 33. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 
2597 (2010). 
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constant, but its location can shift back and forth as a result of 
climatic changes, both large and small. The basic logic of beach 
formation is easy enough to understand. Water runs back and forth 
over land. On the ocean, the beach is extensive in low tide and is far 
less so in high tide. As the water rushes back and forth, no vegetation 
can take root, so the beach is sand and rock. But, the vegetation 
creeps down to the high-water line. If some exogenous shock pushes 
the water higher up, the vegetation dies and a new beach establishes 
itself. If the water level drops, the vegetation pushes outward and the 
beach retreats seaward. With rivers and lakes the mechanism for 
movement of the banks or beach could be somewhat different. It is 
quite easy to see how the changes from the spring melt to the summer 
drought can change the size of a river, and how the constant forces of 
nature can easily change the direction of its flow. The boundaries of 
beachfront property therefore raise profound issues that do not arise 
with respect to most plots of land. 
B. Customary Rights and Common Law 
The key challenge to state property law is to find a set of 
mechanisms to mediate the different regimes for land and water that 
come together on the beach. These problems are very old and the 
solutions to them were customary long before any state legislature 
could address the matter at hand. The practices involved, though, 
were not local customs, which necessarily vary from place to place to 
fit Blackstone’s definition of “particular customs, or laws, which affect 
only the inhabitants of particular districts.”34 These local customs are 
of immense importance. Their distinctive features, however, often 
present serious problems of proof, which are discussed at length in 
David Bederman’s excellent article on the subject.35 It was well 
understood that these particular customs could vary freely across 
districts, without any evident rhyme or reason.36 
Those local customary rights, however, are not what are referred 
to in dealing with the general rules that govern the intersection of 
public and private rights at the beach. The principles involved in 
 
 34. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *74. 
 35. David Bederman, The Curious Resurrection of Custom: Beach Access and Judicial 
Takings, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1375 (1996). 
 36. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 34 (“[P]articular counties, cities, towns, manors, and 
lordships were very early indulged with the privilege of abiding by their own customs, in 
contradistinction to the rest of the nation at large.”). 
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dealing with these nationwide or universal practices were far broader 
and did not depend on specific proof of particular practices, over a 
long period of time, in a given locale, by a specific set of persons. In 
dealing with these practices, Blackstone looked to “general customs; 
which are the universal rule of the whole kingdom,”37 for which no 
individualized proof of custom was required. 
There is a substantial glitch, however, in this effort to paint a 
seamless web between local customs and the common law, which did 
not pass unnoticed. Judge Buller wrote: “How that which may be 
claimed by all the inhabitants of England can be the subject of a 
custom, I cannot conceive. Customs must in their nature be confined 
to individuals of a particular description, and what is common to all 
mankind, can never be claimed as a custom.”38 The key question is 
whether it is possible in principle to overcome that perceived gap. The 
task is not easy. With respect to particular customs, virtually every 
case requires particular proof of the practice dating back a long time, 
which often enmeshes a case in such difficult issues as to the 
geographical extent of the supposed custom, the individuals who are 
bound and benefited by it, and the countless issues of dedication and 
prescription.39 Answering these questions requires a court to establish 
appropriate burdens of proof on each of these matters of material 
fact. The general common law labors under none of these limitations. 
Any custom that is universal does not have any limited geographical 
extent, but applies anywhere and everywhere. Since it is said to be 
universal, there is no need to find some magic start date by which 
time the custom must have been solidified. The clear implication is 
that cut-offs of this variety no longer matter. 
 
 37. Id. at 66. 
 38. Fitch v. Rawling, 2 H. Bl. 393, 398, 126 Eng. Rep. 614, 617–18 (C.P. 1795) (Buller, J.), 
discussed in Bederman, supra note 35. Bederman also cites Earl of Coventry v. Willes, 12 W.R. 
127, 128 (Q.B. 1863), which asserted a custom that the public was entitled to view a horse race 
from its perch on a private manor. The ground given to reject that claim was that “the rights 
possessed by the Queen’s subjects generally are part of the general law of the land, and not the 
customs of a particular place.” The truth, however, is that even if one treated, in line with 
Blackstone’s remark, the common law as a supercustom, this claim was in its very formation so 
particularistic that it would have to be rejected on its individual merits in the absence of any per 
se rule. 
 39. See Bederman, supra note 35, at 1414. Prescription usually refers to situations where a 
particular individual obtains some easement over the land of another. Dedication usually refers 
to the situation where the public at large gains a similar right. With easements, the various 
elements of continuous and open use have to be satisfied by one person. With dedication, the 
public is a shifting group of individuals, so that extensive use by a fluctuating class of individuals 
allows the benefits to go to members of the public who have never entered the property at all. 
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Yet, there has to be a flip side to the problem. The requirements 
for proving a local custom are onerous, which makes sense given the 
observable variations at that level. But there is no reason to impose 
similarly strict requirements on universal customs, whose powerful 
common features generate a dominant solution that, as an empirical 
matter, no one is really prepared to contest. The durability of the 
practice is its strongest calling card. If everyone does it this way, why 
quarrel even if you do not understand how the common practice is 
put together? To the modern functionalist mind, this slavish devotion 
to tradition is, if anything, a source of condemnation. But for most 
traditional writers, the reference to universal custom slipped 
imperceptibly into another mode of address that seems archaic and 
stilted to the modern era. The broad notion of universal practice is 
treated as part of the ius naturale, or those rights given and defined in 
accordance with nature. This natural law strand makes no appearance 
whatsoever in any of the opinions of the Supreme Court in Stop The 
Beach Renourishment,40 which is itself quiet testimony to the extent 
that the natural law thinking of earlier ages has fallen into disrepute. 
III: PROPERTY AND THE IUS NATURALE 
Historically, matters were quite different from the way that they 
appeared to the Supreme Court. There is little doubt that the entire 
body of law that related to the intersection of land and water was 
treated as part of the ius naturale.41 The centrality of this concept is 
evident from the opening passages in both Gaius’s and Justinian’s 
Institutes, which pick up on the same theme. Thus, for Gaius, the lay of 
the land is set out in the opening passage of his Institutes: 
All peoples who are ruled by laws and customs partly make use of 
their own ius, and partly have recourse to those which are common 
to all men; for what every people establishes as ius is their own 
and is called the ius civile, just as the ius of their own city; and 
what natural reason establishes among all men and is observed by 
all peoples alike, is called the ius gentium, as being the ius which 
all nations employ. Therefore the Roman people partly make use 
of their own ius, and partly avail themselves of that common to all 
men, which matters we shall explain separately in their proper 
 
 40. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010). 
 41. See GETZLER, supra note 20, at 65–71, 129–40 (describing Roman law and the 
“substantive nature of water rights” and the “triumph of natural-right analysis” in riparian 
doctrine respectively). 
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place.42 
In dealing with this passage, it is important to note several points. 
The first is the appeal to natural reason—although naturalis ratio is 
better translated as the reason of nature—which suggests that a 
transcendent justification for law does not depend on the vagaries of 
local customs. Cognitive skills and deductive argument seem to 
suffice. It is equally important to note that, by referring to reason, the 
natural lawyers denied that these rules were established in an 
arbitrary fashion by judicial decisions. Instead, they were thought to 
be the result of a process of reason that allows these rules to be 
“common to all men.”43 On this view of the world, general reason, not 
the peculiar dictates of the Florida Supreme Court, is the source of 
law. Thus, the reason of nature should instruct the Florida Supreme 
Court on how to deal with these issues. 
Accepting this view of the subject, as it was surely accepted at the 
time of the Founding,44 Justice Scalia cannot just dismiss the claims for 
compensation raised in Stop the Beach Renourishment solely on the 
ground that the Florida cases (which he over-reads in any event) are 
dispositive to the problem at hand. Indeed, the very treatises to which 
he refers stress time and again that the rules with respect to alluvion 
and avulsion are governed by the natural law and not by any form of 
local custom.45 The 1904 Farnham treatise, for example, contains 
 
 42. G. INST. 1.1. The parallel passages in Justinian are found in J. INST. 1.2.1. The Latin for 
the law of nations is ius gentium, and for law the Latin is ius. Thus, the Latin of the quoted 
passage reads: 
[I. De iure civili et naturali.] 1. Omnes populi, qui legibus et moribus reguntur, partim suo 
proprio, partim communi omnium hominum iure utuntur: Nam quod quisque populus ipse sibi 
ius constituit, id ipsius proprium est vocaturque ius civile, quasi ius proprium civitatis; quod vero 
naturalis ratio inter omnes homines constituit, id apud omnes populos peraeque custoditur 
vocaturque ius gentium, quasi quo iure omnes gentes utuntur. Populus itaque Romanus partim 
suo proprio, partim communi omnium hominum iure utitur. Quae singula qualia sint, suis locis 
proponemus. 
 43. See G. INST. I.1. 
 44. The tradition is most evident in the Declaration of Independence: “We hold these 
truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator 
with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of 
Happiness.” THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776). Self-evidence is yet 
another variation on universal custom. Note that natural rights play little role in the United 
States Constitution, which is a compact between states, but the logic was evident in state 
constitutions of the time. See, e.g., MASS. CONST. of 1780 art. I (“All men are born free and 
equal, and have certain natural, essential, and unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned 
the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing, and 
protecting property; in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness.”). 
 45. See HENRY PHILIP FARNHAM, LAW OF WATER AND WATER RIGHTS 324 (1904) 
(“When it is determined that a separate parcel of land is accretion or alluvion, it is the property 
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references to rights that are jure naturae, by the right of nature.46 “The 
right to future alluvial formation or batture is a vested right, inherent 
in the property itself, and forming an essential attribute of it, resulting 
from natural law in consequence of the local situation of the land.”47 
Elsewhere, that same treatise says, in criticism of some state-law cases, 
that “the stream is created by nature, and man has no right to destroy 
it.”48 Instructively, that treatise also states that the state has never 
attempted to avoid its obligation to provide compensation when it so 
interfered with water rights “to dispose of the land in front of its 
grantees of shore land because ‘the attempt to make such grants is 
calculated to render titles uncertain, and derogate from the value of 
natural boundaries, like streams and bodies of water.’”49 The appeal to 
natural law was likewise made in Lewis’s treatise, where he quotes at 
length from the decision of the House of Lords on the question of 
“whether a riparian proprietor on the banks of a tidal navigable river 
had any rights or natural easements similar to those which belong to a 
riparian proprietor upon a non-tidal stream.”50 In ways that differ 
from the modern American law on the navigation servitude, that 
question was answered in the affirmative so that the riparian rights 
survived. The Lord Selborne squarely rested his decision on natural 
law by noting that “[t]he rights of a riparian proprietor, so far as they 
relate to any natural stream, exist jurae naturae, because his land has, 
by nature, the advantage of being washed by the stream . . . .”51 
This extensive reliance on the natural law dates back to Roman 
times, where the laws of alluvion and avulsion were part of the natural 
law as defined by Gaius and Justinian in their respective Institutes. 
These classical texts, moreover, do not at any point treat these forms 
of property as though they are owned by the state. Rather the term is 
that they are “public,” which refers to a system that guarantees all 
persons open access, not to a system of state-owned properties like 
public buildings and amphitheaters.52 In this regard, it is instructive to 
 
of the owner of the bank to which it forms, the same as though it had always existed there. This 
is the rule recognized by the law of nations.”). 
 46. Id. at 111, 280, 294. 
 47. Id. at 330 n.8. Batture refers to “deposits along the shore of the Mississippi river.” Id. at 
330. 
 48. Id. at 613. 
 49. Id. at 316 (quoting Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371, 381 (1891)). 
 50. JOHN LEWIS, LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN 89 (Chicago: Callaghan & Co., 1888). 
 51. Id. at 90 (quoting Lyon v. Fishmongers Co., 1 App. Cas. 662, 682 (1876)). 
 52. For the difference, see J. INST. 2.1.1–3, contrasting the sea and the shore, which are 
open to all, with those things that are said to belong to the corporate body, like theaters and 
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quote from Gaius to see how the matter was perceived. 
(70) Land acquired by us through alluvion also becomes ours 
under the same law. This is held to take place when a river, by 
degrees, makes additions of soil to our land in such a way that we 
cannot estimate the amount added at any one moment of time; 
and this is what is commonly stated to be an addition made by 
alluvion, which is added so gradually as to escape our sight.53 
(71) Therefore, if the river should carry away a part of your land 
and bring it to mine, that part will still continue to be yours.54 
(72) But, if an island rises in the middle of a river, it is the common 
property of those who possess land on both sides of the stream; but 
if it is not in the middle of the river, it will belong to those who 
have land on the nearest bank of the stream.55 
There is a lot that can be learned from these simple passages. Let 
us start with alluvion, move on to occupatio and accessio, and then 
turn to avulsion, which is only addressed in Justinian, who found 
(correctly) that Gaius was incomplete on this point. 
A. Alluvion 
First, in the key passage, “the same law” refers to the law of 
nature, which Gaius had elaborated on in preceding sections of his 
Institutes that were devoted to showing how the natural laws on 
occupation allowed individuals to take title to land, wild animals, and 
chattels, each with its own peculiar variations, based of course on the 
nature of the type of property acquired.56 Since these rules are part of 
the law of nature, there is no mention here of any particular source of 
law or any particular custom that creates the rights in question. There 
is, however, the clear implication that the rules are followed by just 
about everyone, so that one test of their rationality is their 
commonality and durability. It is not a formal justification of why the 
rules make sense, but an instructive test that can be applied to 
indicate that they do work well. The constant shift between natural 
reason and rules common to all men makes sense. 
 
racecourses. The key point is that rights of exclusion make perfectly good sense for the latter, 
where the rights to exclude are functional, but they make no sense with the former. 
 53. G. INST. 2.70. 
 54. Id. at 2.71. 
 55. Id. at 2.72. 
 56. See id. at 2.66–69 (describing property rules over animals and land). For the parallel 
passages in Justinian, see J. INST. 2.2.1–19. 
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This is doubly true in this context because, with respect to the 
natural modes for the acquisition of property, no formal devices (such 
as the Roman mancipatio—a formal conveyance obsolete by the time 
of Justinian) 57 are needed to explain how title is obtained. The want of 
formality is what tends to distinguish the natural law from the civil 
law. Thus, the natural law will posit marriage as a natural relationship, 
but then leave the ceremonies for marriage to the civil law. Similar 
rules apply with respect to contracts and conveyance. There is, 
accordingly, far less reason to expect any local variation in the natural 
modes of acquisition. 
Second, Gaius explains that the rules on alluvion apply to those 
incremental adjustments to ownership that are too small to “estimate” 
at any point in time.58 He offers no systematic argument on behalf of 
that critical proposition. Rather, in line with the work by most natural 
law theorists, both he and Justinian tend to rely on dogmatic 
assertions of the way things are without offering any detailed 
explanation of why they remain that way.59 It does not follow, 
however, that we cannot find any explanation for the rules in question 
that makes sense, in our time as well as in theirs. 
With respect to alluvion, the explanations draw from a useful mix 
of common sense and basic economic theory. On the former issue, 
boundary disputes in ancient times were, if anything, far more 
important than they are today, where it is possible to describe land by 
metes and bounds and to protect any land title by state action. The 
easiest way to define boundaries is to say that “my plot runs down to 
the river,” which is just the way that everyone, everywhere, describes 
the situation in ordinary speech. Hence, it is easy to see the customary 
ways in which the norm was established. 
That everyday statement also contains the seeds of profound 
economic wisdom. As a practical matter, that sentence should not be 
rendered false if the river bank itself moves by small increments that 
can barely be observed. It adds to the stability of possession that these 
random perturbations of a given equilibrium point do nothing to alter 
the ownership of the land. The opposite position could easily result in 
having the same point on the earth’s surface count as the boundary 
line between two riparians even if it moves to the middle of the river. 
 
 57. For a description of how mancipatio worked, see G. INST. 1.119. These rules also 
applied for the conveyance of land, slaves, and certain herd animals. Id. at 1.120. 
 58. G. INST. 2.70. 
 59. See, e.g., G. INST. 2.70–78; J. INST. 2.1.20–25. 
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The constant geographical position could separate the former riparian 
from the river by a sliver of land too small to be viable economically. 
Clearly, two riparians are better than one, or perhaps even none. This 
is not one of those situations where fine calipers are needed to 
measure the gains or losses from choosing the right rule for a 
situation that is defined by topology, not politics. The alluvion rule is 
universal precisely because of the winning combination of sensible 
property rights and low administrative costs. 
B. Occupatio and Accessio 
The Roman law of occupatio involves the natural modes of 
acquisition of things that were previously unowned. The law of 
accessio arises when two things owned by separate individuals are to 
some extent combined into a single whole, which thereafter gives rise 
to the question of whether to undo the union, divide the ownership, or 
pay compensation to one side for the loss of its rights.60 Those rules do 
not work well with respect to an island that arises in the middle of the 
stream, belonging to either or both riparians depending on its exact 
location. The key point is not how those disputes are likely to be 
resolved. Rather, it is that the creation of the new land does not create 
any claim for the “state,” which is nowhere mentioned in this account 
of how ownership rights are assigned. Essentially, it gets rid of the rule 
of first possession that normally applies to unoccupied land and limits 
the universe of potential takers for the land to the riparians on both 
sides of the river, conceivably more than one on each side. 
Clearly these rules have to be modified to some extent to deal 
with littoral lands, where there is only one shore and not two banks. 
The modifications in question, however, should not go to the question 
of incremental changes by the beach because the same considerations 
at work in the riparian context carry over with equal force in this 
context. Access to the ocean is the critical variable and there is no 
reason for it to be disturbed by these incremental movements in the 
shore. To be sure, these are often more extreme in many locations 
than are movements in the banks of the river, but the size of the 
variance does not look to be the decisive feature, except to this extent: 
If the movement of the ocean boundary is so extreme that an entire 
plot of land is wiped out, the abutting land now becomes riparian 
 
 60. For the basic rules, see BARRY NICHOLAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW 
(1976); for the explanation of how and why these works work, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, 
SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 67–70 (1995). 
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land, subject to the same rules on alluvion. If the land that washed 
away is somehow magically restored in anything like its original form 
within a short period of time, the new littoral owner could perhaps be 
demoted again to inland status. A question of this sort, however, is not 
likely to generate anything close to the same consensus as the original 
basic rule that allows a riparian or littoral owner to maintain his 
access to a river or lake in the face of any small fluctuations of the 
location of the river, stream, ocean, or lake. 
The position of riparian and littoral owners also differs with 
respect to the case of new land. For littoral owners, new land could 
arise at an extensive distance from the shore, so that recognizing the 
littoral owner’s presumptive claim to that distant land seems far 
weaker than the comparable claims of riparians for an island that 
emerges in the middle of the river. In light of these physical realities, 
the rule changes such that the ownership of the island, according to 
Justinian, belongs to the first party to occupy the land.61 But he does 
not follow the general rules governing ownership of land islands that 
lie within rivers, which is, as he notes, the much more common 
occurrence.62 In these cases, there is little benefit from letting a third 
party gain access to small slivers of property that are more efficiently 
divided between the two riparian owners. One vital point, however, is 
the common feature of both these rules. The state does not enjoy any 
greater rights in the littoral context than it does in the riparian one. 
Any new island is fair game for any taker. It does not in any way, 
shape, or form become the property of the state. Nor need it, because 
the first possession rule does not require any state office for its 
implementation, in sharp contrast to a land or patent registry, which is 
necessarily a creature of the state. 
Thus far I have not discussed the short passage in Gaius’s 
Institutes, Book II, Section 71, which deals with land that has been 
dislocated from its original perch and carried downstream.63 That 
 
 61. J. INST. 2.1.22. 
 62. Id. (“When an island is formed in the sea, which rarely happens, it is the property of the 
first occupant; for before occupation, it belongs to no one. But when an island is formed in a 
river, which frequently happens, if it is placed in the middle of it, it belongs in common to those 
who possess the lands near the banks on each side of the river, in proportion to the extent of 
each man’s estate adjoining the banks. But, if the island is nearer to one side than the other, it 
belongs to those persons only who possess lands contiguous to the bank on that side. If a river 
divides itself and afterwards unites again, thus giving to any one’s land the form of an island, the 
land still continues to belong to the person to whom it belonged before.”). Note that Justinian 
offers the correct solution to the problem of the divided river. 
 63. G. INST. 2.71. 
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passage is clarified by the slightly longer discussion in Justinian, which 
notes that the removed soil remains the property of its original owner 
so long as it is in a free (i.e., unattached) state. Quite simply, the 
Roman rules (and ours) do not think that the movement of one thing 
onto the land of another by natural forces is sufficient to transfer 
ownership. Usually, a voluntary transaction is required. Thus, no one 
would think that a roof uprooted by a storm would become the 
property of the person on whose land it eventually landed. That roof 
would remain the property of the owner, who might be required to 
bear the costs of its removal if he wished to reclaim ownership. The 
distinctive feature with respect to land is that the rules on ownership 
change when it is no longer possible to simply return the thing to its 
original owner.64 Thus, Justinian provides that “[i]f, however, it remains 
for long united to your neighbor’s land, and the trees, which it swept 
away with it, take root in his ground, these trees from that time 
become part of your neighbor’s estate.”65 
This rule makes eminently good sense for two reasons. First, the 
process of taking root is not instantaneous, such that once the trees 
take root it is quite sensible to apply some inchoate notion of an 
individual waiver or statute of limitation to bar the action for return. 
Second, the return of the property makes no sense because it would 
necessarily result in a diminution of property value, which, from an ex 
ante perspective, does not work to the advantage of any riparian. To 
be sure, it might well be possible to introduce some notion of 
compensation for the additional land, but that would be exceedingly 
difficult to determine. In addition, compensation would not serve any 
useful social function in this context. The land in question was taken 
by forces of nature, so that these cases do not raise the serious moral 
hazard associated with the taking of land (for public purposes, we 
hope) by government parties. In those circumstances, an explicit price 
mechanism via a just compensation requirement makes perfectly 
good sense as a constraint on government appetites to acquire land 
 
 64. Id. 
 65. J. INST. 2.1.21. The parallel to the rules of accessio, which govern the combination of 
one thing out of the inputs of two people, cannot be overlooked. See G. INST. 2.72–79 (treating 
these natural modes of acquisition just after the discussion of riparian rights); see also J. INST. 
2.1.25–34, (treating natural modes of acquisition just after the discussion of riparian rights). 
Note that in Gaius, the discussion of natural modes of acquisition takes place after the 
discussion of the formal modes of conveyancing, which to the modern mind is out of 
chronological sequence since acquisition normally precedes transfer. The order is reversed, 
surely consciously, in Justinian because the abolition of mancipatio made it easier to take the 
two topics in their natural sequence. 
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for public projects. In these cases, however, the land movement is 
done by no human agency, so that the simple prompt request to allow 
for the return of the detached bit of land is sufficient to deal with any 
potential source of individual misconduct. 
C. Avulsion 
The situation once again shifts with avulsion. In the case of rivers, 
the rapid shift in location is not amenable to the solution that is used 
in the alluvion cases. The extent of the shift is not possible to calculate 
in the land and could easily cover extensive territory, so that the new 
course of the river runs through the land of individuals who were not 
riparians when the river was on its previous course. In these cases, the 
only sensible rule is the one adopted by Justinian: 
23. If a river, entirely forsaking its natural channel, begins to flow 
in another direction, the old bed of the river belongs to those who 
possess the lands adjoining its banks, in proportion to the extent 
that their respective estates adjoin the banks. The new bed follows 
the condition of the river, that is, it becomes public. And, if, after 
some time, the river returns to its former channel, the new bed 
again becomes the property of those who possess the lands 
contiguous to its banks.66 
Once again, Justinian gets it exactly right. It is pointless to think 
that the old riparians could claim that status with respect to lands that 
they never owned. Hence, the sensible solution is to treat, by 
operation of law, the new set of riparians as owners of the land as it 
runs down its new course. The abandonment of the old riverbed then 
raises the question of ownership, and here the Romans took the 
correct position that the land was divided between the two adjacent 
parties.67 In taking that view they necessarily rejected the view that 
the newly dried land could be taken by the first possessor. Smart. 
What possible use is there in a long thin strip of land under separate 
ownership? The automatic rule leads to reduced uncertainty and 
cleaner property lines. By taking this position, Justinian necessarily 
rejected, yet again, the view that the state could make any special 
claim to this property, especially because the rules were developed 
before the advent of the state. 
 
 66. J. INST. 2.1.23. 
 67. See id. 
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D. Littoral Rights 
The same problem cannot arise for littoral rights, but variations on 
the theme can. For example, if a violent storm cuts off some portion of 
an owner’s land from the remainder, there is no reason why he should 
not continue to own what he did before, while the new channel is 
public water just as it would have been if nothing were there. 
Likewise, if the waters inundate the land so that it disappears under 
public waters, the land is lost to its original owners. In dealing with the 
problem of inundation from rivers, Justinian again takes the correct 
position that once the waters retreat into the natural channel, the land 
reverts to its original owner. The solution is less clear when the oceans 
or lake wipe out littoral land (or even inland parcels), only to restore 
some fraction of it years later. It may well be that, at that latter point 
in time, the better solution is for the new littoral owner to extend his 
land out to where the previous owners had held title. It is just too 
costly to figure out what to do with the original owner when only a 
tiny slice of his land resurfaces from the waters. But for these 
purposes, these details—on which honest differences of opinion can 
arise—do not matter. The two points that do emerge are these: First, 
the rules on alluvion and avulsion apply only to natural events, for 
there is no mention of any form of human intervention in any of the 
quoted passages from Gaius or Justinian.68 The standard modern 
definitions of avulsion reflect just that settled understanding: “The 
removal of land from one real property and its deposit on the 
property of another, by the sudden action of nature (e.g., water or 
volcano).”69 Second, somewhat more narrowly, “[a] sudden removal of 
land caused by change in a river’s course or by flood.”70 The 
restriction to actions by nature is critical because once human 
interaction is introduced the question of incentives for good and bad 
behavior becomes the linchpin for the overall analysis. 
Similarly, the rules in question at no time allow the changes in 
natural topography to create a state interest in the land in question. 
Rather, at all points the applicable phrase is that the rivers, lakes, and 
oceans are publici juris, dealing with the right of the public to access 
these waters. The challenge in modern law is to apply this body of law 
to those cases in which state action is responsible—whether for good 
 
 68. G. INST.  2.66–79; J. INST. 2.2.1–34. 
 69. Avulsion Definition, DUHAIME.ORG, http://www.duhaime.org (last visited Apr. 15, 
2011). 
 70. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 157 (9th ed. 2009). 
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reason or bad—for the change in the flow of rivers, lakes, or oceans. It 
is just these issues that come into play in Stop the Beach 
Renourishment, in which Justice Scalia acutely senses that he is about 
to fall off an intellectual cliff. He is dead on the money when he talks 
about the role of a doctrine of judicial takings. Once he turns to the 
particulars of the case before him, however, he barrels down the 
wrong track to a judicial train wreck. 
IV. JUDICIAL TAKINGS AND ITS MISAPPLICATION IN STOP THE 
BEACH RENOURISHMENT 
A. The Takings Clause and Judicial Action 
In dealing with Stop the Beach Renourishment, there is much to be 
said for Justice Scalia’s initial proposition that the Takings Clause of 
the Constitution applies to judicial as well as legislative action.71 He 
puts the point well when he writes: 
There is no textual justification for saying that the existence or the 
scope of a State’s power to expropriate private property without 
just compensation varies according to the branch of government 
effecting the expropriation. Nor does common sense recommend 
such a principle. It would be absurd to allow a State to do by 
judicial decree what the Takings Clause forbids it to do by 
legislative fiat.72 
In effect, Justice Scalia combines two powerful positions of 
constitutional interpretation applicable in this case.73 The first is a 
close textual reading, which does not in this instance reference the 
source of the taking, but rather uses the passive voice, making it broad 
enough to cover all branches of government. The second approach is 
more functional: If the legislature and the executive can be stopped, 
why not the courts? Judicial decree (with an intended sense of 
 
 71. For the earlier articulation of the point, see the concurring opinion of Justice Stewart in 
Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 294–98 (1967). For an extended discussion, see Bederman, 
supra note 35, at 1436–38. See also Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Judicial Takings, 76 VA. L. REV. 
1449, 1463 (1990). 
 72. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2601 
(2010). I ignore here the extensive dialogue between Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Breyer on 
this doctrine, which is analyzed in Richard A. Epstein, Privacy and the Third Hand: Lessons 
from the Common Law of Reasonable Expectations, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1199, 1203–10 
(2009); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: A Tangled Web of Expectations, 45 STAN. L. 
REV. 1369 (1993). 
 73. For further development, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SUPREME NEGLECT: HOW TO 
REVIVE THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS (2008). 
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arbitrariness) and legislative fiat are cut from the same cloth. That 
same approach was taken in connection with the First Amendment 
guarantee of freedom of speech in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.74 
That case upended huge bodies of the state common law of 
defamation on constitutional grounds, even though the First 
Amendment applies explicitly only to acts of Congress.75 Yet, the 
Supreme Court, speaking through Justice William J. Brennan, resisted 
any invitation to apply it only to state statutes and not to state 
common-law rules.76 
Justice Scalia’s position on judicial takings is especially strong in 
light of the previous discussion, where it was assumed that the 
creation of these rights in the first instance did not follow from any 
judicial decision whatsoever, but from the long-standing common 
understanding of how alluvial and avulsive changes impacted the 
riparian or littoral rights.77 Thus, if the consequences of alluvion were 
clear, any judicial decision that altered the initial balance should be 
regarded as a taking of private property. At that point the state must 
supply compensation unless it can offer some police power 
justification for its action. This is indeed the constant theme of the 
earlier treatises, which note that while the rights of riparian owners 
might be at the “mercy” of the English Parliament, they were strongly 
protected against expropriation by federal or state action.78 
The power of vested rights has been recognized with various kinds 
of local customs. It should apply with equal force to the universal 
rules on alluvion and the like, which had complete traction long 
before they were announced or ratified in any judicial opinion. In this 
regard, Hawaiian customary law, expertly analyzed by Professor 
Bederman, is especially dense and offers a good laboratory to test the 
general problem of judicial takings.79 The key point is that this basic 
principle works in both directions, such that a claim of private 
ownership by occupation should be rejected in the face of a custom 
that treats transitional beach land as common property. Bederman 
 
 74. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 75. See U.S. CONST. amend I (“Congress shall make no law . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 76. New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 265. 
 77. See supra Part III. 
 78. See FARNHAM, supra note 45, at 613 (using the term to state that even where property 
rights are completely at the “mercy of Parliament, a local body supplying its district with water 
has no power other than that given by statute to alter the flow of the water of a stream, although 
the alteration causes no sensible damage to riparian proprietors”). 
 79. Bederman, supra note 35, at 1426–34. 
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points first to In re Ashford,80 in which the littoral owner sought to 
register title to the land located between the vegetation line and the 
high-water mark—the dry beach, which in Hawaiian goes under the 
name “me ke kai.” Yet the tradition on this issue ran clearly in the 
opposite direction, so that this effort at private encroachment was 
squelched, as it should have been. The universal rule is that private 
occupation is not allowed for any form of property that is held in 
common, lest the commons disintegrate by noncooperative forms of 
individual behavior. At most, there are sensible practices that allow 
for temporary use of the beach as a refuge from storm, but none that 
allow permanent occupation.81 
By the same token, an aggressive (mis)interpretation of custom 
should not be allowed to trump established property rights. The way 
in which this transformation can be undertaken is revealed in a 
discussion of three cases dealing with a profit à prendre, that is, a right 
to gather sticks and other small objects from the land over which 
another individual holds legal title.82 As with many local customs, the 
peculiarities of geography matter, for a custom like this one could 
never develop with respect to lands that did not offer these 
opportunities for collection. In dealing with these issues, the 
dimension of the custom is key.83 In Kalipi v. Hawaiian Trust Co.,84 the 
court began by noting that “traditional gathering rights do not accrue 
to persons, such as the Plaintiff, who do not live within the ahupuaa in 
which such rights are sought to be asserted.”85 From this it was an easy 
leap to the proposition that these individuals, at the least, could not 
use their claims to the custom to block any development that a 
landowner might otherwise make of his property.86 The people who 
benefited were those individuals who lived in a given ahupuaa, which 
is a portion of the island that is defined by the valley that starts at the 
top of the mountain and works itself down to the seashore. 
As stated in this fashion, the local custom seems to coexist with 
the general common-law system of property rights, which was 
 
 80. In re Ashford, 440 P.2d 76 (Haw. 1968), discussed in Bederman, supra note 35, at 1428. 
 81. See J. INST. 2.1.5, (the correct translation of the Latin is “hut,” not “cottage”). 
 82. See Bederman, supra note 35, at 1417–25. 
 83. For the basic discussion, see Bederman, supra note 35, at 1426–35, from which this 
narrative is drawn. 
 84. Kalipi v. Hawaiian Trust Co., 656 P.2d 745 (Haw. 1982). 
 85. Id. at 752. 
 86. Id. 
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incorporated explicitly into the Hawaiian Constitution of 1892.87 Put 
in this form, the reconciliation makes good sense. These ahupuaas are 
of exceptional importance in Hawaiian water law. Water coming down 
mountainsides does not easily lend itself to distribution under a 
riparian system, as there are no rivers with banks. These ahupuaas 
define the class of individuals who are eligible to use that water, which 
is essential to avoid the risks of overconsumption that are always 
posed by any scarce resource.88 In effect, the localization of the 
custom prevents an excessive surcharge on the common resource, in 
much the way that limiting the right to withdraw water from the river 
is limited to riparians for riparian use only. 
By the same token, the rule has the right relationship between the 
profit à prendre and development rights. When land is in its idle state, 
the right to collect twigs and branches is of little or no inconvenience 
to anyone, so the custom grew up to exploit that possible source of 
gain. The genius of the custom is that it is never generates permanent 
title by prescription so that landowners are not put in the position of 
having to take unnecessary steps to exclude others when such actions 
are both expensive and counterproductive. This situation is not 
unprecedented in the law, for the strategy of allowing the use right 
while tolling the statute of limitations parallels the legal treatment to 
the coming of the nuisance doctrine at common law. In that setting, a 
person whose property is next to vacant land can make extensive use 
of his own property until the neighbor chooses to build, at which time 
the statute of limitations starts to run.89 That configuration of rights 
accomplishes two objectives. First, it allows the maximum extraction 
of value from both parcels of land combined. Second, it prevents the 
statute of limitations from running until an actual conflict emerges, 
thereby reducing the possibilities of litigation. For courts to switch the 
rule around in the Hawaiian context is a great mistake. It takes the 
trivial rights of gathering that were traditionally subordinate to 
development and turns them into superior rights that may now be 
 
 87. See 1892 Haw. Sess. Laws ch. 57, 5 (codified as amended at HAW. REV. STAT. (1994)) 
(“The common law of England, as ascertained by English and American decisions, is declared 
to be the common law of the State of Hawaii in all cases, except as otherwise expressly provided 
by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or by the laws of the State, or fixed by 
Hawaiian judicial precedent, or established by Hawaiian national usage.”). 
 88. See Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 753 F.2d 1468 (9th Cir. 1985). This decision inserted state 
ownership where it was not needed. Id. at 1475. This decision, however, has not been generally 
approved. See Bederman, supra note 35, at 1438. 
 89. See generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, PRINCIPLES FOR A FREE SOCIETY: RECONCILING 
INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY AND THE COMMON GOOD (1998). 
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used to block development projects of vastly greater value. This 
approach gives any landowner a strong incentive to block the 
development of any custom at all. In contrast, the rule that allows 
members of the larger community a set of “fill in” rights, lasting until 
development starts, permits an interim use to add value to the land in 
ways that do not prejudice the long-term position of the landowner. 
The older custom is therefore efficient in the way that newly 
articulated judge-made rule is not. To be sure, it is always possible for 
any developer to try to buy back rights to development. Yet, given the 
inchoate group that possesses these rights, the ability to buy back the 
rights, in the context of a holdout, is a slim possibility. 
The original sensible treatment in Kalipi was undercut in Pele 
Defense Fund v. Paty.90 There the court refused to limit gathering 
rights to those within the ahupuaa because the claimants introduced 
affidavit evidence indicating that these gathering rights extended to 
others on the island. The evidence used was far weaker than what 
would be needed to satisfy Blackstone’s exacting standard for proving 
a local custom.91 The much more dramatic switch took place in Public 
Access Shoreline Hawaii [PASH] v. Hawai’i County Planning 
Commission,92 insofar as it inverted the relationship between the local 
custom and the common-law development rights by treating the 
profit à prendre (often held by a broad and diffuse group of 
individuals) as sufficient to block future development.93 At this point 
it is difficult to disagree with the assessment of Bederman when he 
writes: 
It is one thing (as has already been suggested) to use custom in a 
parcel-by-parcel examination of community rights and interests. It 
is quite another to use custom as a means of rewriting the 
jurisdiction’s general property law, and, with one stroke of the 
judicial brush, to declare public easements in the entirety of the 
state’s beaches.94 
It is, of course, not likely that any state court that has introduced 
such mayhem with development rights will invalidate its own judicial 
 
 90. Pele Defense Fund v. Paty, 837 P.2d 1247 (Haw. 1992). 
 91. Id. at 1222. 
 92. Public Access Shoreline Haw. [PASH] v. Haw. Cnty. Planning Comm’n, 903 P.2d 1246 
(Haw. 1995), criticized in Bederman, supra note 35, at 1431–35. 
 93. See PASH at 1272 (“Thus, to the extent feasible, we hold that the HPC must protect 
the reasonable exercise of customary or traditional rights that are established by PASH on 
remand.”). 
 94. Bederman, supra note 35, at 1441. 
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decision on constitutional grounds. Certainly, the federal courts 
cannot review a state-law decision on state-law constitutional 
grounds, but it makes good sense with respect to these general rights 
to treat judicial nullification of established customs as a taking under 
state law, which is subject to federal reexamination, just as Justice 
Scalia held in Stop the Beach Renourishment.95 That point is especially 
true in connection with the ius naturale where there are no local 
uncertainties that interfere with the understanding of the underlying 
rights. There are a number of judicial decisions and articles that take 
this position.96 The question is whether it was applied correctly to the 
Florida situation in Stop the Beach Renourishment. The answer to that 
question is unfortunately not, as the next section explains. 
B. The Misunderstanding of Judicial Takings in Stop the Beach 
Renourishment 
However strong Justice Scalia’s decision is on the grand question 
of judicial takings, it misfires in understanding how the argument 
should proceed in the context of this particular case. His decision 
starts with the view that it is the holdings of earlier Florida decisions 
that establish the background norm against which the claim of a 
judicial taking must be made.97 Justice Scalia’s point reflected the way 
in which the case had evolved in the Florida courts. The State had 
argued that there could be no judicial takings because under Florida 
law, the littoral owner did not enjoy any protected access to the water 
in the first place, so that there was nothing left to take. In dealing with 
this challenge, Justice Scalia makes no mention of the ius naturale in 
relation to these cases. Nor does he make any effort to ask whether 
the Florida decisions he examines are sound. The only question that 
he brings himself to address is whether these earlier cases—none of 
which are discussed in the proceedings below—gave the State a leg up 
in dealing with this question.98 
Right off the bat, it is clear that he misapprehends how these rules 
on littoral rights should work. After his long discussion on judicial 
takings, he continues as follows: 
 
 
 95. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2609–
10 (2010). 
 96. See Somin, supra note 3. 
 97. Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2611–12. 
 98. Id. 
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Two core principles of Florida property law intersect in this case. 
First, the State as owner of the submerged land adjacent to littoral 
property has the right to fill that land, so long as it does not 
interfere with the rights of the public and the rights of littoral 
landowners. . . . Second, if an avulsion exposes land seaward of 
littoral property that had previously been submerged, that land 
belongs to the State even if it interrupts the littoral owner’s 
contact with the water. . . . The issue here is whether there is an 
exception to this rule when the State is the cause of the avulsion. 
Prior law suggests there is not. In Martin v. Busch, 93 Fla. 535, 112 
So. 274 (1927), the Florida Supreme Court held that when the 
State drained water from a lakebed belonging to the State, causing 
land that was formerly below the mean high-water line to become 
dry land, that land continued to belong to the State. . . . 
Thus, Florida law as it stood before the decision below [in this 
case] allowed the State to fill in its own seabed, and the resulting 
sudden exposure of previously submerged land was treated like an 
avulsion for purposes of ownership. 99 
It is instructive to compare this outlook to the treatment of the 
same subject under the ius naturale. Martin v. Busch100 is the only case 
that need be examined to illustrate the legal chasm. Martin does not 
explain why the state should have ownership of the land it drained. If 
the earlier conceptions of natural law applied, that land would be a 
res nullius or owned by the owner of the littoral lands,101 thereby 
avoiding the risk that the state could profit handsomely from its own 
conduct. The critical question, however, is whether the draining of the 
lake should be regarded as a taking of the property rights of the 
littoral owner. In order to answer that question, the proper approach 
is to put the matter this way: Suppose that the drainage in question 
had been worked by a private party to the detriment of the owner of 
the littoral land, whose property values were diminished by virtue of 
the loss of view on the one hand and access to the lake on the other. It 
is perfectly clear that anyone who dams up a river so that it does not 
flow by the property of a lower riparian has committed a major tort in 
every jurisdiction that deals with the subject. By the same token, it is 
hard to see how the littoral owners on a lake would have no ability to 
enjoin that kind of action when done by a private party, especially one 
who intends to occupy the land for his own use and benefit. 
 
 99. Id. at 2611 (citations omitted). 
 100. Martin v. Busch, 112 So. 274 (Fla. 1927). 
 101. See G. INST. 2.72. 
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The question then is: What difference does it make that the state 
does the taking? In this context, we do not have to trouble ourselves 
with the difference between cases that involve beaches and those that 
only involve land that is far removed. In each case, the only difference 
between the state and the ordinary private party is that the former 
cannot be enjoined while the latter can, so long as the taking is for a 
public use.102 The point of this test is to prevent the kind of dangerous 
political arbitrage whereby those individuals who would have to buy  
rights in the private context now expend energies before legislatures 
and planning bodies to obtain political cover that allows them to 
acquire these rights for nothing at all.103 In this situation, it would be 
odd to say that the regulation in question is needed to prevent some 
abuse by the littoral landowners. It is not as though they have 
committed any form of common-law nuisance that their neighbors 
could have enjoined by right. Put bluntly, it is a case in which the state 
has no credible police power justification for its action. 
At this stage in the argument, one can concede that emptying a 
lake counts as a public purpose, under any test one prepares to 
announce. The only question, therefore, is whether there is a duty to 
pay compensation. The reason for the just compensation requirement 
of the Takings Clause is to make sure that the coercive power of the 
state, which cannot be enjoined, is only used to transfer property from 
lower to higher-valued uses.104 Forcing the state to supply 
compensation is the only possible way to rein in the political factions 
that would otherwise consume legislative and administrative 
branches. In some instances, it is possible to find that general statutes 
of uniform application create a form of in-kind compensation that 
dispenses with the need for cash payments between the parties. Thus, 
in the case of reciprocal easements that, on net, benefit each person 
subject to the general ordinance, the right way to think about the 
problem is to treat the loss of the right to build (say to the edge of a 
lot line) as the taking of property for which full compensation is 
rendered by the imposition of a like restriction on a neighbor. There is 
no need to belabor the intricacies of that formulation here. It is 
sufficient to note that none of the littoral owners in Martin received 
any sort of benefit from the draining of the lake that offset their loss 
 
 102. See TAKINGS, supra note 23, at 332–33. 
 103. For an expanded account of this theme, see Epstein, Playing by Different Rules, supra 
note 8. 
 104. See EPSTEIN, SUPREME NEGLECT, supra note 73, at 89–93. 
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of traditional littoral rights.105 The decision therefore represents a 
howling intellectual blunder that is wholly inconsistent with the 
general pro-property rights vision that rests with the ius naturale. Why 
this decision should be regarded as the baseline against which the 
claim is measured is an unexplained mystery. Recall that Justice Scalia 
did say that “judicial decrees” were no better than “legislative fiat.”106 
If there was ever a case that was a sheer judicial decree in need of 
constitutional amputation, Martin is it. 
Nonetheless, Justice Scalia shrinks away from applying that coup 
de grace. At one point, he invokes his own oft-quoted statement from 
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council107 that government action 
depriving a property owner of all “economically beneficial use of his 
land” is not a taking if the restriction “inhere[s] in the title itself, in the 
restrictions that background principles of the State’s law of property 
and nuisance already place upon land ownership.”108 But he never 
closes the loop to note that whatever one wants to say about Martin, it 
does not reach that status. There is no legal support, even in the 
misguided Martin decision, to support the view that the drainage of an 
inland lake should be regarded as an avulsion for which no 
compensation was in fact awarded. He is in fact queasy about that 
conclusion when he writes: 
The result under Florida law may seem counterintuitive. After all, 
the Members’ property has been deprived of its character (and 
value) as oceanfront property by the State’s artificial creation of 
an avulsion. State-created avulsions ought to be treated differently 
from other avulsions insofar as the property right to accretion is 
concerned. But nothing in prior Florida law makes such a 
distinction, and Martin suggests, if it does not indeed hold, the 
contrary.109 
“Counterintuitive!?” A better word is horrendous. Justice Scalia’s 
reading of Martin violates every known reading of the ius naturale 
against which it should be tested. It makes far more sense in this 
context to knock out a malign state-court decision than it does to 
follow it slavishly, even though it is bankrupt on the very points that 
 
 105. Martin v. Busch, 112 So. 274 (Fla. 1927). 
 106. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 
2601 (“It would be absurd to allow a State to do by judicial decree what the Takings Clause 
forbids it to do by legislative fiat.”). 
 107. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
 108. Id. at 1029. 
 109. Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2612. 
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are at issue. The matter here is not one of those fine points on which 
learned judges could differ in their opinion. It is just a howling 
mistake that Justice Scalia follows. 
How, then, should he have proceeded? The sensible way is to see 
whether Stop the Beach Renourishment can be distinguished from the 
earlier decision in Martin. That exercise requires that the Supreme 
Court spend less time on the abstract question of whether there can 
be a judicial taking and more time looking at the statute itself. In this 
case, moreover, the differences matter. Justice Scalia held that this 
particular “avulsion” should be treated like a natural event, even 
though government agents engineered it from top to bottom. It is 
instructive that even Martin did not contain the word avulsion in its 
decisions. The consequence was that the state owned the land outright 
and in fee simple. By the logic in question, there would be nothing 
wrong with the state, in its role as owner of private property, deciding 
to exclude all others, including the former littoral owners, from the 
property and from building a wonderful high rise that would block 
the view of those same littoral owners. After all, if no property rights 
are taken, the state can act just like any other property owner. 
It is worth noting that the Florida legislature did not entertain 
such grotesque ambitions for its scheme. To Justice Scalia, it could not 
matter at all that the statute took explicit steps to preserve rights of 
both access and view over the land that was subject to the state’s 
intervention in the case. The reason his approach is wrong, though, is 
that these both matter a lot. Recall that compensation for a statutory 
scheme could come in cash or in kind.110 In this case, the limitations 
that the state imposed on itself offer huge in-kind benefits to the 
former littoral owners who are now guaranteed the two key incidents 
of ownership normally associated with littoral land.111 The key 
question, therefore, is the extent to which these furnish the needed in-
kind benefits. In principle, it looks as though access and view from a 
distance are not as valuable as those benefits one had as a littoral 
owner. The picture is incomplete, however, because the creation of the 
erosion line offers a protection to littoral owners that may well tip the 
balance in favor of just compensation. Furthermore, the littoral owner 
loses any rights to expansion of his or her land that come with 
alluvion. 
 
 110. See EPSTEIN, SUPREME NEGLECT, supra note 73, at 49–50. 
 111. 1961 Fla. Laws ch. 61–246, amended by, FLA. STAT. §§ 161.011–161.45 (2007). 
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In deciding whether any landowner is hurt by this statutory 
intervention, four factors have to be put into the mix: (1) the loss of 
accretion, which has to be set against (2) the protection of land on the 
landward side of the barricade, (3) the preservation of easement of 
access, and (4) that of the easement of view. The appropriate 
disposition of the case, therefore, is to remand to the lower court to 
see how the four factors net out. On remand, the obvious difficulty is 
that all these owners may not be similarly situated so that some 
individuals are left better off than others. The best way to deal with 
that complication is to start with a typical landowner and see which 
way the balance cuts. Thereafter, each individual landowner could 
introduce evidence to indicate that his position is worse or more 
vulnerable than those of his neighbors. The State could introduce 
evidence on the other side. My own guess is that the State will fare 
fairly well under this calculation, which shows ironically that a careful 
combination of the right definition of property rights with the correct 
eminent-domain analysis can lead you to the right place. 
V. JUDICIAL TAKINGS WRIT LARGE 
Thus far I have argued that the application of the doctrine to 
judicial takings should curb actions such as those taken by the Florida 
Supreme Court in cases like Martin v. Busch. One serious objection to 
adopting a doctrine of judicial takings is that it might lead to the 
unfortunate state of affairs where every switch in state common-law 
rules could lead to a federal constitutional challenge.112 To be sure, the 
possibility of that extravagant reading cannot be dismissed on a priori 
grounds. But, by the same token, it is important to stress just how 
narrow a rule is needed in order to pick off cases like Martin without 
granting federal courts the position of a council of revision on steroids 
over state laws. 
Ironically, the best way to understand the appropriate balance is 
to generalize from the distinction between alluvion and avulsion. The 
Supreme Court should only intervene in those cases that look like 
avulsions—radical deviations from established practice that are made 
without rhyme or reason. In this case, the transformation was 
complete. The standard rules of avulsion never allowed for man-made 
changes.113 The moral hazard from such a rule was too great. That 
 
 112. See, e.g., Dogan & Young, supra note 4. 
 113. See supra notes 68, 69, and accompanying text. 
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certainly applies in Martin, where state intervention resulted in giving 
the state uncontrolled fee ownership of the lakebed. The striking 
feature about the case was that it equated a situation where there was 
no moral hazard—avulsion—with those cases where the risk of moral 
hazard is greatest—deliberate state action from which the 
government profits and littoral owners lose. 
This last observation offers some clue as to how best to attack the 
question of judicial takings. Begin with those cases where the risks of 
misbehavior are greatest. That approach is taken with respect to 
political action, and one line of cases where that is undoubtedly true 
involves the situation where the government has an interest in the 
outcome of the case. Nearly 50 years ago, Professor Joseph Sax faced 
just this question in seeking to work out what he thought to be 
appropriate limits for the takings doctrine by asking such questions as 
whether the abolition of the privity rule in product liability cases, or 
the defense of charitable immunity more generally, should count as 
takings.114 From his perspective, the correct answer to both these 
queries is sharply in the negative because he thinks that the critical 
distinction in this area is that between arbitral and entrepreneurial 
rules: 
The rule proposed here is that when economic loss is incurred as a 
result of government enhancement of its resource position in its 
enterprise capacity, then compensation is constitutionally required; 
it is that result which is to be characterized as a taking. But losses, 
however severe, incurred as a consequence of government acting 
merely in its arbitral capacity are to be viewed as a non-
compensable exercise of the police power.115 
It is worth examining both the uses and limitations of this 
distinction. On one side, it makes sense to cast a suspicious eye on 
government activities that enhance the government’s position, as took 
place in Martin.116 Here, the case falls securely on the less problematic 
side of the line and compensation could be paid to those parties hurt 
by this particular rule, given that in each case the dollars owed are 
triggered not just by the passage of legislation, but by the concrete 
decision to drain a particular site. The difficulties, however, emerge on 
the other side. The traditional accounts of the police power did not 
 
 114. Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 51 (1964). 
 115. Id. at 63. 
 116. See Martin v. Busch, 112 So. 274 (Fla. 1927) (where the state is awarded ownership of 
the land it has drained). 
DO NOT DELETE 6/21/2011  12:25:40 PM 
2011] LITTORAL RIGHTS UNDER THE TAKINGS DOCTRINE 69 
extend to any and all efforts in which the government sought to 
adjudicate disputes between private parties. Rather, it extended only 
to those cases in which the government sought by appropriate means 
to advance the “health, safety, morals, or general welfare,” of the 
population, which is far narrower, but which receives no mention in 
the Sax account.117 
The consequences of this distinction are substantial. Using this 
definition of police power, decisions like Lochner v. New York118 
suddenly become credible when it can be shown that the decision to 
impose a ten-hour maximum work-day statute was intended to 
benefit unionized bakers at the expense of their non-union opponents. 
At this point, the statute was declared an illegal labor statute and 
struck down accordingly. Now let us suppose, as I believe, that the 
earlier decision in Lochner was far sounder than the subsequent 
judicial decisions that spelled its demise. The next question is: Should 
the United States Supreme Court act differently on this matter if the 
ten-hour work day was declared to be state policy by a judicial 
decision that equally upset the ordinary common-law rules on 
freedom of contract? I see no reason to accept the distinction. To 
writers like Professor Sax, the point hardly matters because they 
would never allow a legislature to strike down this sort of law. But if 
the freedom of contract is allowed to regain its status as a real 
constitutional principle, the issue of judicial takings has to be faced. In 
this regard, moreover, it is instructive to note that both the abolition 
of the privity rule and of charitable immunity are suspect precisely 
because in each case the rule was applied in such a fashion that 
blocked any effort to contract away from the rule.119 That issue is one 
that far transcends this discussion, but suffice it to say that if the 
legislative version of the action passes constitutional muster, then the 
judicial version passes muster as well. The modern rational basis test 
as it applies to a wide range of property and contract regulations does 
not raise this question today. 
 
 117. See Sax, supra note 114. 
 118. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 119. For products liability, see Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 
1960) (blocking the use of disclaimers as unconscionable in implied warranty actions brought by 
nonpurchasers of the product), and President & Dirs. of Georgetown Coll. v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 
810 (D.C. Cir. 1942) (Rutledge, J.). I explore the boundaries between tort and contract on these 
questions in Richard A. Epstein, Toward a General Theory of Tort Law: Strict Liability in 
Context, Article 6, 3 J. TORT LAW (2010) (defending charitable immunity in consensual, but not 
in stranger, cases). 
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Yet, in principle, surely it should. To return to Sax’s formulation, it 
is always risky to use the pronoun “its” as a way to describe 
government action.120 As a brute fact of nature, all actual decisions are 
made by either individuals or groups of individuals. There is therefore 
a real risk that one side in any partisan battle can seize the power of 
the state and turn it to its end. Thus, the situation in cases like Stop the 
Beach Renourishment would hardly improve if the lakebed were 
given to some designated private developer once the water was 
removed from it. It is therefore incumbent as a matter of first 
principle to look at the major forms of redistribution that judicial 
decisions can work between private parties. At this juncture, the old 
line between alluvion and avulsion helps show the way. If the 
doctrinal changes introduced by judicial decisions are incremental 
and do not unfairly favor one class of actors over another, they should 
normally be allowed to pass. Thus, a change in the parol evidence rule 
to allow in more or less evidence does not put the judicial thumb on 
the side of either landlords or tenants. The rule may be wise or foolish, 
but the sensible response is to let it pass because there is no obvious 
tilt in its application. Indeed, from the ex ante perspective, there is 
reason to hope that the new change leaves all parties better off. 
In those cases where there is an abrupt change that works in one 
direction, however, a much closer level of scrutiny ought to apply. This 
should be the case, for example, when a well-established statute of 
limitations opened up in ways that benefit only one side, which was 
the case with respect to those many statutes that lift the protection of 
the statute of limitations on lapsed cases in such hot-button areas as 
criminal prosecution of child abuse.121 The same logic should apply to 
lifting the statute of limitation by legislation for civil actions brought 
by private parties. I see no reason why that result should differ if the 
state court decided to lift the statute of limitations of its own motion. 
So understood, it seems that the proper scope of the judicial takings 
doctrine is dependent on the ability to mirror the decisions used to 
evaluate legislative or executive decisions achieving the same end. In 
both contexts, every effort should be made to avoid interfering on 
small adjustments that have no clear distributional consequences. It is 
 
 120. For an illustration of the dangers, see Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective 
Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 453 (1988), where customary tribal claims over public lands were dismissed 
on the ground that the government could do what it wanted with “what is, after all, its land.” 
 121. See, e.g., Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 632–33 (2003) (striking down by a five-to-
four vote under the Ex Post Facto Clause to the United States Constitution a state statute that 
removed the protection of the statute of limitations for criminal prosecutions of child abuse). 
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not, in my view, sufficient to invoke the doctrine of judicial takings to 
show that the case law on a difficult point such as the scope of the fair 
use privilege in copyright should trigger the application of this 
doctrine, if only because there is no secure natural law basis that 
undergirds the creation of that elusive privilege. What is really 
needed, therefore, is a massive affront to established doctrine of the 
sort found in Stop the Beach Renourishment. 
VI. WHY THE BREAKDOWN OF PROPERTY RIGHTS? 
At this point, the question arises: How it is possible to get such 
poorly reasoned decisions like Stop the Beach Renourishment in the 
Supreme Court? In this instance, it is hard to attribute the serious 
mistakes in the case to any ideological division. Even if the usual 
conservative/liberal split arises on the question of whether judicial 
takings are cognizable in federal court under the Takings Clause, 
there is nothing about the outcome or analysis of the case that shows 
Justice Scalia to be an ardent defender of the property rights to which, 
in the end, he attaches no real weight. In this instance, I think that 
there are two chronic modern mistakes that lead to the result. First, 
the Supreme Court has an unnecessary level of nominalism in dealing 
with the definition and enforcement of property rights. Second, the 
Court has no real appreciation of how a systematic theory of takings 
works except in the most simple of contexts. I have discussed this 
issue exhaustively elsewhere,122 and thus will only hit the high points 
here. 
To see why, it is instructive to discuss for a moment two cases that 
Justice Scalia cited without discussion for the apparently innocent 
proposition that “state law defines property interests, including 
property rights in navigable waters and the lands underneath them.”123 
The two cases, St. Anthony Falls Water Power Co. v. St. Paul Water 
Commissioners124 and United States v. Cress,125 in fact, represent quite a 
difference in world views. St. Anthony Falls involved two operators of 
dams and sluices for the use of the water within a navigable river for 
their own power plants.126 The state of Minnesota, by legislation, 
 
 122. See Epstein, Playing by Different Rules, supra note 8. 
 123. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2597 
(2010) (citations omitted). 
 124. St. Anthony Falls Water Power Co. v. St. Paul Water Comm’rs, 168 U.S. 349 (1917). 
 125. United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917). 
 126. St. Anthony, 168 U.S. at 353. 
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authorized another company to divert the water from the Mississippi 
for use in its business, to the detriment of the defendant below.127 The 
United States Supreme Court denied the two plaintiffs any injunctive 
relief, holding, in effect, that the state had within its power the ability 
to define property rights as it saw fit within a navigable river so that 
the takings claim was out of place.128 Under the approach that I 
developed in this article, that decision is wrong, given that the 
government is not entitled to order, without compensation, any 
diversion that a private party could not commit by itself. 
Cress involves actions by the federal government and thus 
necessarily had to deal with actions that were authorized under the 
Commerce Clause with respect to the operation of an interstate 
river.129 In dealing with this issue, Justice Mahlon Pitney took the view 
that I defend here and refused to allow the recognition of the 
navigation easement to snuff out the property rights of ordinary 
riparians, whether they are located on a navigable or nonnavigable 
river.130 That decision was, for all intents and purposes, overruled in 
Justice Robert Jackson’s highly influential but ultimately facile 
decision in United States v. Willow River Power Co.,131 which was 
explicit in its view that the state has untrammeled power to define 
property rights in navigable and nonnavigable rivers and thus is 
allowed to engage in works on a navigable river that removed from an 
upper riparian, in this instance, on a nonnavigable river, the right to its 
head of water.132 The decision rested on the key assumption that 
property rights were highly malleable. In Justice Jackson’s view, “not 
all economic interests are ‘property rights’; only those economic 
advantages are ‘rights’ which have the law back of them, and only 
when they are so recognized may courts compel others to forbear 
from interfering with them or to compensate for their invasion.”133 But 
what is needed here is not a stirring declaration of the limits of 
private property rights, but a concrete explanation of exactly how to 
determine which economic interests are property rights and which are 
not, which Justice Jackson never supplied. Needless to say, the ius 
 
 127. Id. at 354. 
 128. Id. at 367. 
 129. See Cress, 243 U.S. at 319 (where the states’ authority to establish property laws is 
subject to Congress’s authority to regulate navigable streams for the purpose of commerce). 
 130. See id. at 321. 
 131. United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499 (1945). 
 132. See id. at 511. 
 133. Id. at 502. 
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naturale did not figure in any of these calculations and reflections. 
In effect, Willow River rejects the two premises that make Cress 
the only intelligent modern decision dealing with navigation 
easements. First, Cress refuses to allow either legislatures or states to 
just define away property rights that fall comfortably within the 
existing categories.134 The contagion quickly spread beyond these 
water law cases. It is no coincidence, for example, that Professor Sax, 
in dealing with a wide range of government regulations, quoted just 
this passage in his effort to insulate all sorts of changes in the law 
governing private relationships from constitutional oversight.135 In his 
view, the decision stood for the proposition that any “mere 
diminution” in value should be the source of compensation from the 
state.136 But that is not the point of contention here. In all private 
settings the standard rule is that competitive injury is not actionable, 
even—make that especially—for “established firms” that are 
unaccustomed to competition.137 Nor is it any surprise that Justice 
Jackson’s dictum was extended to land-regulation cases. Indeed, in his 
ill-conceived decision in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of 
New York,138 Justice William Brennan relied on just that decision to 
rule that the vested air rights under New York state law did not have 
any weight in supporting a requirement of compensation for a 
landmark-preservation law that prevented the construction of a tower 
over Grand Central Station.139 Does anyone think that a judicial 
declaration that it is no longer possible to create or protect air rights 
in New York does not count as a judicial taking? 
All these cases make a common error. Use of the words “private 
property” in the Takings Clause is clear evidence that the Framers did 
not regard the institution as subject for degradation by legislation or 
judicial administration. They were all firmly in the natural law camp 
and none of them, as was common at the time, thought that there was 
any deep cleavage between the dictates of natural law and the general 
welfare of the public at large. The modern legal realism simply 
disregards those conceptions. If, as I have argued here, the institutions 
of property that were battered yet again in Stop the Beach 
 
 134. Cress, 243 U.S. at 329. 
 135. See Sax, supra note 114, at 51. 
 136. Id. 
 137. For a discussion of how this plays out, see Richard A. Epstein, Property Rights, State of 
Nature Theory, and Environmental Protection, 4 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 1 (2008). 
 138. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124–25 (1978). 
 139. See id. at 136. 
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Renourishment have real firmness and highly desirable social 
properties, then the legal nominalism of the United States Supreme 
Court comes at a high price. The newly indefinite property rights open 
the way to political intrigue that leads to extensive dissipation of 
social wealth in pointless factional intrigue. At this point, we can only 
wonder: Why does it matter if the Supreme Court labors hard to 
establish a doctrine of judicial taking if it mangles its application in 
the cases that matter most? It is hard to write intelligently about the 
constitutional protection of private property without a deep and 
accurate knowledge of the subject—an expertise that is not in great 
supply in the United States Supreme Court. 
 
